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Malaria -Great Exuma, Bahamas, May-June 2006
Malaria in humans is caused by four distinct protozoan species of the genus Plasmodium (P. falciparum, P. vivax, P. ovale, and P. malariae). These parasites are transmitted by the bite of an infective female Anopheles mosquito (1) . In the Caribbean region, malaria has been eliminated from all islands except Hispaniola, the island consisting of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Elimination of malaria elsewhere resulted from a combination of integrated control measures, socioeconomic development, and close public health surveillance. However, even Caribbean islands where malaria is no longer endemic remain at constant risk for reintroduction of the disease because of their tropical climate, presence of competent malaria vectors, and proximity to other countries where malaria is endemic. This susceptibility was underscored by the recent outbreak of malaria on the island of Great Exuma in the Bahamas; during May-June 2006, a total of 19 malaria cases were identified. Four of the cases, in travelers from North America and Europe, are described in this report; such cases of imported malaria can signal the presence of a malaria problem in the country visited and thus assist local health authorities in their investigations. On September 19, after 3 months with no report of new cases, CDC rescinded its previous recommendation that U.S.-based travelers take preventive doses of the antimalarial drug chloroquine before, during, and after travel to Great Exuma.* Case 1. On May 24, 2006, a man aged 33 years from the United States received a diagnosis of malaria in a hospital emergency department in Virginia. The patient had intermittent fever, sweats, abdominal discomfort, nausea, and vomiting, which had begun during a May 4-7 visit to Great Exuma, where the patient had stayed in a resort hotel. The patient had no history of exposure to malaria. Blood smears on May 24 indicated P. falciparum. After outpatient treatment with chloroquine, changed later to quinine and doxycycline, the patient recovered uneventfully.
Case 2. On June 6, a woman aged 29 years from Germany received a diagnosis of P. falciparum malaria in a hospital in Germany. She had experienced fever, headache, nausea, and vomiting since May 30, near the end of a May 18-31 visit to Great Exuma. After her return to Germany, the woman was treated initially with antibiotics for suspected sinusitis. However, her illness persisted, and she was hospitalized on June 6 with high fever and neck stiffness. Diagnostic tests included magnetic resonance imaging of her head, a lumbar puncture to exclude meningitis, and a blood smear that revealed P. falciparum. She was treated with artemether-lumefantrine and recovered.
Case 3. On June 16, a man aged 20 years from Canada had P. falciparum malaria diagnosed. The man had been born in the Bahamas and had visited friends and relatives there during April 19-June 11, spending most of his time in Georgetown, the most populous city on Great Exuma. On June 14, the man experienced fever and chills and went to an emergency department for evaluation after learning that his cousin had been treated recently for malaria on Great Exuma. The diagnosis of P. falciparum malaria was confirmed by blood smear on June 16. He was treated on an outpatient basis with chloroquine followed by atovaquone-proguanil and recovered uneventfully.
Editorial Note:
The Bahamas is an archipelagic nation in the northern Caribbean Sea, consisting of approximately 700 islands and 2,400 cays stretching between Florida and Haiti ( Figure) . Persons from Hispaniola and other countries have emigrated to the Bahamas, where malaria is not endemic and only one imported case was reported in 2005. However, because of frequent travel and relocation among countries, health-care providers in the Bahamas and other countries where malaria is not endemic should remain alert to the risk for this disease, especially in travelers and immigrants. Introduced malaria is much less common than imported malaria but of greater epidemiologic significance. Imported malaria usually occurs when travelers acquire the infection while visiting areas where malaria is endemic. Introduced malaria typically occurs when infected travelers return home and transmit the infection to local Anopheles mosquitoes, which subsequently transmit it to local residents. Left unchecked, this process can result in reestablishment of endemic malaria in countries that have previously eliminated the disease because these areas have climatic conditions favorable to transmission and Anopheles species that are receptive to malaria parasites. In the United States, 1,320 cases of imported malaria were reported in 2004 (1) , and 63 episodes of introduced malaria were detected from 1957 to 2003, the year when the latest episode occurred in Florida (2) (3) (4) .
Available evidence indicates that during May-June 2006, Great Exuma experienced an outbreak of introduced malaria that was successfully contained and terminated. The observations that all cases were caused by P. falciparum and a substantial proportion of patients were immigrants from Haiti suggest that malaria was introduced by those immigrants. All patients treated with chloroquine responded to the treatment, which is a further suggestion that the parasites originated from Haiti, where P. falciparum has remained sensitive to chloroquine. P. falciparum causes 99% of malaria cases in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (MD Milord, Ministry of Public Health and Population, Haiti, and JM Puello, National Center for Control of Tropical Diseases, Dominican Republic, personal communication, 2006), which share the only Caribbean island still endemic for malaria. Conversely, P. vivax causes 94% of cases in Mexico and Central America (5) .
The successful containment of this malaria outbreak is attributable to several factors. The first identified case, detected in a foreign tourist returning from the Bahamas, was promptly reported to the Bahamian MOH, which responded with several complementary interventions, including identification and treatment of patients and asymptomatic parasite carriers and institution of mosquito-control measures. Fewer than 30 days elapsed between diagnosis of the first identified case in Virginia and diagnosis of the last case on Great Exuma. Since June 19, no additional cases have been noted, despite intensive ongoing surveillance among febrile patients.
In view of these findings, CDC has rescinded recommendations made on June 16, 2006, that travelers take preventive doses of chloroquine before, during, and after travel to Great Exuma. As of September 19, CDC no longer recommends that travelers to Great Exuma take antimalarial prophylaxis.
This malaria outbreak illustrates the importance of vigilance by health-care providers and rapid response by public health authorities for successful containment (2) and also might provide incentive for measures to eliminate malaria from all Caribbean islands, including Hispaniola. Recently, the International Task Force for Disease Eradication recommended that Haiti and the Dominican Republic work jointly to eliminate from Hispaniola both malaria and lymphatic filariasis, two vectorborne parasitic diseases that have been eliminated from all other Caribbean islands (6) . Agreements reached in July 2006 between the ministries of health of Haiti and the Dominican Republic represent a first step toward achieving this goal.
Inadvertent Misadministration of Meningococcal Conjugate Vaccine -United States, June-August 2005
During June-August 2005, CDC and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were notified of seven clusters of inadvertent subcutaneous (SC) misadministration of the new meningococcal conjugate vaccine (MCV4, Menactra) (Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., Swiftwater, Pennsylvania), which is licensed for intramuscular (IM) administration only. A total of 101 persons in seven states were reported to have received MCV4 by the SC route. Of these, 100 were contacted by their healthcare providers and advised of the administration error. CDC conducted an investigation to determine whether SC administration of MCV4 resulted in a protective immunologic response. This report describes the results of that investigation, which indicated that, despite the misadministration, persons vaccinated by the SC route were sufficiently protected and that revaccination was not necessary.
In 1978, the meningococcal polysaccharide vaccine (MPSV4, Menomune) (Sanofi Pasteur) was licensed in the United States for administration by the SC route. The newer MCV4 is a tetravalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine that was licensed in January 2005 on the basis of immunogenic noninferiority to MPSV4 and demonstrated safety (1) . Both vaccines protect against Neisseria meningitidis serogroups A, C, Y, and W-135. Because immunogenicity and safety of MCV4 were assessed for IM administration only, the vaccine is licensed for IM use only. The immunogenicity and safety of MCV4 after SC administration were not evaluated.
CDC contacted the providers who inadvertently misadministered the vaccine to inform them of the investigation. Providers contacted the vaccinees to advise them of the error and invite them to participate in the investigation. Twelve nonserious adverse events* were reported among 54 persons from whom providers solicited such information. Eleven events were local reactions, including injection-site rash, tenderness, swelling, induration, or pain, and one was a fever of 1 day's duration. The frequency and nature of adverse events among these persons are similar to those reported after IM vaccination in MCV4 licensure trials (1) .
Providers collected single serum samples from 21 to 105 days after vaccination from 38 SC vaccinees who agreed to participate (response rate: 38%). Serology results from a group of 372 subjects available from the manufacturer's prelicensure MCV4 clinical trial database, with serum samples collected 21 to 42 days after IM vaccination, were used as age-matched controls for comparison with the SC vaccinees. Age-matched comparison of rSBA response was conducted because of the effect of age on serologic response to MCV4. Immune responses for each vaccine serogroup (A, C, Y, and W-135) were measured by serum bactericidal assay using baby rabbit complement (rSBA). Serologic testing of the SC vaccinees was performed by the same laboratory using the same methods used to test the IM vaccinees from the MCV4 clinical trial. Geometric mean titers (GMTs) of SC vaccinees were compared with those of age-matched IM vaccinees from the MCV4 clinical trials. Titers of individual vaccinees were evaluated for each vaccine serogroup to determine whether the vaccinees developed a protective response as a result of the SC vaccination; rSBA titers >8 were considered protective (2, 3) .
For each of the four vaccine serogroups, the proportion of SC vaccinees with rSBA titers >8 was >97% and did not dif-fer significantly (by Fisher exact test) from the proportion of IM vaccinees with rSBA titers >8 (Table) Editorial Note: The most likely reason for the inadvertent misadministration of MCV4 described in this report was that the older meningococcal vaccine, MPSV4, in use for nearly 30 years, is licensed for SC administration, whereas MCV4 is licensed only for IM administration. This reason was cited by health-care providers participating in the investigation.
Although the overall serologic response for SC vaccinees was lower than that of IM vaccinees as determined by GMTs, nearly all persons vaccinated by the SC route developed rSBA titers >8, which was considered protective on the basis of recent population-based studies of meningococcal C conjugate vaccine efficacy in the United Kingdom (2,3). Therefore, CDC determined that this particular group of persons vaccinated by the SC route was sufficiently protected and that revaccination was not necessary.
CDC cautions health-care providers to be aware that the licensed route of vaccine administration can vary among similar vaccines and recommends that providers carefully review and follow the route of administration indicated on the vaccine label and package insert before administering vaccines. This is especially important after introduction of a new vaccine product.
Effects of Measles-Control
Activities -African Region,
1999-2005
In 1999, of approximately 871,000 deaths from measles worldwide, 61% occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (1). In 2001, countries in the World Health Organization (WHO) African Region began an accelerated measles-control program to reduce by half by 2005 the number of deaths that were caused by measles in 1999 (2) . The African Region accelerated measles-control program was based on four strategies: improving routine vaccinations; providing a second opportunity for measles vaccination through a routine, 2-dose vaccination schedule or through supplementary immunization activities (SIAs)*; improving measles case management; and establishing case-based surveillance with laboratory confirmation for 
Immunization Activities
WHO and UNICEF publish annual country-specific estimates of routine measles vaccination coverage; these estimates are based on reviews of vaccination coverage surveys, national reports, administrative coverage data, and consultation with regional and local experts (3) . According to these estimates, coverage with 1 dose of measles vaccine in the African Region among children aged 12-23 months increased from 52% in 1999 to 67% in 2004. In 2004, 37 of the region's 46 countries were estimated to have coverage rates >60%, and 17 countries were estimated to have coverage rates >80% (4).
By 2000, seven countries in the African Region had completed national catch-up SIAs, and during December 2001-December 2004, 25 additional countries completed national catch-up SIAs. Ten of these 32 completed national follow-up SIAs. Measles vaccination coverage rates during these SIAs were >90%, except for the catch-up SIAs in Republic of the Congo (78%), Eritrea (82%), Ethiopia (87%), and Gabon (80%) and the follow-up SIAs in Lesotho (75%), Swaziland (81%), and Zimbabwe (85%). By December 2004, a total of 207.9 million children in 32 countries had been targeted by catch-up SIAs, which is 69% of the population of children aged <15 years in the African Region. During the same period, 16.1 million children aged 9-59 months in 10 countries were targeted by follow-up SIAs, which represents 14% of the population of children aged <5 years in the African Region.
Measles Surveillance
Since the 1980s, the annual number of country-specific measles cases has been reported by the country's ministry of health each year to WHO's Regional Office for Africa. Before implementing catch-up SIAs, all countries reported measles cases to WHO through routine infectious disease information systems that provided aggregated data. The cases reported through this surveillance system were not laboratory confirmed; they were reported on the basis of clinical suspicion.
After conducting their catch-up SIAs, countries began implementing a case-based surveillance system with laboratory confirmation of suspected measles cases. In this system, each case is reported using an individual case-report form, and a blood specimen is obtained for measles immunoglobulin M (IgM) testing at a national laboratory. When a cluster of three or more cases from a health-facility catchment area has been confirmed, subsequent cases from that area are considered confirmed by epidemiologic linkage, and blood samples are not collected. The quality indicators used for the case-based surveillance system include the proportion of reported cases with a blood specimen (goal: 80% of cases not confirmed by epidemiologic linkage) and the proportion of districts reporting at least one suspected case with a blood specimen per year (goal: 80%). For Niger and Tanzania, the total number of cases with a blood specimen was <80% of the aggregate case total, so aggregate case totals were used for analysis. For all other countries, blood specimens were obtained for >90% of reported cases.
Analysis of Surveillance Data
Countries were grouped according to the year in which they conducted their catch-up SIAs; number of reported cases by country group and year during 1990-2005 were calculated ( Figure) . Of the Group A ¶ countries, six completed catch-up SIAs by December 1999, and the seventh completed its catchup activities by the end of 2000; these countries had a measleselimination goal rather than a mortality-reduction goal (5) . In countries that completed SIAs, the total number of suspected measles cases decreased 93%, from 202,972 in 1999 to 14,284 (Table) ; 1999 was chosen as the year for comparison because it is the baseline year for the measles mortalityreduction goal, and the initial catch-up SIAs in all countries other than the Group A countries were conducted after 1999. The number of cases in 1999 was obtained from aggregated reports of cases that were diagnosed on the basis of clinical signs and symptoms; few of these cases have laboratory confirmation, and they include other diseases consistent with the clinical case definition of measles (e.g., rubella). In 2005, after establishment of case-based surveillance, cases were confirmed by a laboratory or through epidemiologic linkage; confirmed case totals were available for all countries except Gabon, Liberia, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. In 2005, aggregate data also were used for Niger because case-based surveillance was not fully operational in the country. Tanzania reported 713 possible cases through the case-based system, but because blood samples were obtained from <80% of cases, aggregate data were used in the calculations. Countries with no report for 1999 (Gabon) or 2005 (Madagascar) were excluded from the calculations.
To maintain consistency in the case definition, clinically suspected measles cases reported in 2005 (i.e., which include cases not counted later after they had negative IgM serology results) were used in the calculations. The 93% decrease during 1999-2005 in suspected cases demonstrated substantial progress in countries that have implemented accelerated measles-control activities.
To minimize the effect of using a single year as a baseline for a disease with cyclic epidemics, reports of suspected cases in 2005 also were compared with the average number of cases that occurred during 3 years (1998) (1999) (2000) . When the 3-year average was used as a baseline (N = 200,683 cases), reported cases also decreased 93%.
Editorial Note:
The results of this report indicate a consistent and marked decrease in the number of measles cases reported from the WHO African Region country groups that completed nationwide measles catch-up SIAs during 1996-2004. These countries have experienced a >90% reduction in clinical measles cases in 2005 compared with 1999. In contrast, the number of reported cases continued to vary widely by year in the group of countries that had not completed nationwide catch-up SIAs. Although countries do not report measles deaths to WHO, an analysis of country-level data from 13 countries in the African Region that completed nationwide catch-up SIAs during late 2001 to early 2002 documented that the percentage reduction in reported deaths from measles was similar to that for reported cases of measles (6) . The use and analysis of surveillance data in this report suggest that case-based measles surveillance with laboratory confirmation in the African Region is providing useful information for monitoring program effects.
The increase from 2,988 cases in 1999 to 3,626 cases in 2005 from countries in Group A (Table) is largely a result of the increase in cases reported from South Africa. For example, have not yet been covered, including 29 million children in southern Nigeria and 7 million children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Successful control of measles in the African Region will depend on conducting high-quality campaigns (i.e., campaigns that achieve >95% coverage) in these areas. At the same time, countries should continue to improve their routine immunization services, maintain high coverage with follow-up SIAs every 3-5 years, improve measles case management, and monitor their success by using case-based surveillance with laboratory confirmation to control measles and reach the global goal of reducing measles mortality.
Update: Influenza ActivityUnited States and Worldwide, May 21-September 9, 2006
During May 21-September 9, 2006, influenza A(H3), influenza A(H1), and influenza B viruses cocirculated worldwide and were identified sporadically in North America. This report summarizes influenza activity in the United States and worldwide since the last MMWR update (1).
United States
In the United States, CDC uses seven systems for national influenza surveillance (2), four of which operate year-round: 1) the World Health Organization (WHO) and the National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) collaborating laboratory systems; 2) the U.S. Influenza Sentinel Provider Surveillance System; 3) the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System; and 4) a national surveillance system that records pediatric deaths associated with laboratory-confirmed influenza. Data from these four systems are included in this report.
During May 21-September 9,* WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories in the United States tested 14,751 respiratory specimens; 318 (2%) were positive for influenza (Figure) A viruses that were not subtyped. The majority (92%) of these isolates were tested from mid-May through late June, when 3.6% of specimens tested were positive for influenza. Since July 1, of specimens tested, 0.6% were positive for influenza. During May 21-September 9, the weekly percentage of patient visits to sentinel providers for influenza-like illness (ILI) † remained below the national baseline § of 2.5% and ranged from 0.6% to 0.9%. The percentage of deaths attributable to pneumonia and influenza as reported by the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System remained below the epidemic threshold. ¶ One influenza-related pediatric death occurred and was reported to CDC during this period.
Worldwide
During May 21-September 9, influenza A (H3), influenza A (H1), and influenza B viruses cocirculated worldwide. Influenza A (H1) viruses predominated overall in Asia; however, in early summer, influenza B viruses predominated in Japan. In Africa, South Africa reported predominantly A (H3) viruses, and Madagascar reported a limited number of A (H3) and A (H1) viruses. In Europe and North America, small numbers of influenza A and influenza B viruses were reported. In Oceania, influenza A viruses predominated, with both influenza A (H1) and influenza A (H3) viruses circulating; influenza B viruses circulated at lower levels. In South America, influenza A (H1) viruses were most commonly reported, but influenza A (H3) and influenza B viruses also were identified.
Characterization of Influenza Virus Isolates
The WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Control of Influenza located at CDC analyzes influenza virus isolates received from laboratories worldwide. Vaccination is the best method for preventing influenza. Influenza vaccine is recommended for persons at increased risk for influenza-related complications and severe disease (e.g., persons aged >50 years, children aged 6-59 months, pregnant women, and persons aged 6 months-49 years with cer- † Defined as a temperature of >100.0°F (>37.8°C), oral or equivalent, and cough and/or sore throat in the absence of a known cause other than influenza. § The national baseline was calculated as the mean percentage of patient visits for ILI during noninfluenza weeks for the preceding three influenza seasons, plus 2 standard deviations. Noninfluenza weeks are those in which <10% of laboratory specimens are positive for influenza. Wide variability in regional data precludes calculating region-specific baselines; therefore, applying the national baseline to regional data is inappropriate. National and regional percentages of patient visits for ILI are weighted on the basis of state population. ¶ The seasonal baseline is projected using a robust regression procedure that applies a periodic regression model to the observed percentage of deaths from pneumonia and influenza during the preceding 5 years. The epidemic threshold is 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline. tain medical conditions) and for health-care workers and household contacts of persons at increased risk (4). In addition to the groups for whom influenza vaccination is recommended, influenza vaccine can be administered to anyone who wants to reduce the likelihood of becoming ill with influenza.
For
is available. The optimal time for influenza vaccination is during October-November; however, vaccine should be offered throughout the influenza season, even after influenza activity has been documented in the community.
As a supplement to influenza vaccination, antiviral drugs aid in the control and prevention of influenza. However, high levels of resistance to the antiviral adamantanes (i.e., amantadine and rimantadine) have been identified among circulating influenza A (H3) viruses; therefore, CDC continues to recommend against use of the adamantane class of antivirals for the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza in the United States until susceptibility to adamantanes has been reestablished among circulating influenza A isolates (5,6).
The ongoing widespread epizootic of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) in Asia, Africa, and Europe remains a major public health concern. As of September 9, 2006, influenza A (H5N1) had been reported in migratory birds or poultry flocks in Africa, Asia, and Europe, with human cases reported from 10 countries in Africa and Asia. No evidence of sustained person-to-person transmission has been identified, although limited person-to-person transmission has occurred (7) . No cases of infection with highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) have been identified in humans, poultry, or migratory birds in the United States. In collaboration with local and state health departments, CDC continues to recommend enhanced surveillance for possible influenza A (H5N1) infection among travelers with severe unexplained respiratory illness returning from countries affected by influenza A (H5N1) (8).
Influenza surveillance reports for the United States are posted online weekly during October-May at http://www.cdc.gov/ flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm. Additional information about influenza viruses, influenza surveillance, the influenza vaccine, and avian influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu. † Calculated by summing the incidence counts for the current week, the two weeks preceding the current week, and the two weeks following the current week, for a total of 5 preceding years. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/files/5yearweeklyaverage.pdf. § Not notifiable in all states. ¶ Includes both neuroinvasive and non-neuroinvasive. Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, VectorBorne, and Enteric Diseases (proposed) (ArboNET Surveillance). ** Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II . † † Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed)). Implementation of HIV reporting influences the number of cases reported. Data for HIV/AIDS are available in Table IV -1  15  46  93  Arkansas  2  2  6  79  61  139  78  142  2,876  3,220  -0  2  7  7  Louisiana  -0  4  12  41  34  158  354  5,941  7,151  -0  2  3  32  Oklahoma  6  2  24  89  109  97  77  764  3,115  3,230  -1  14  34  49  Texas†   N  0  0  N  N  691  548  757 20,855 18,930  -0  2  2  5   Mountain  40  30  55  1,076  1,016  165  216  552  7,676  9,655  3  4  8  153  167  Arizona  7  3  36  107  97  92  86  201  3,105  3,480  1  1  7  72  86  Colorado  11  9  33  371  360  52  46  90  1,462  2,275  1  1  4  41  35  Idaho†   2  3  11  116  98  -2  10  112  75  -0  1  3  4  Montana  5  2  11  70  50  -3  20  138  107  -0  0  --Nevada†   -1  6  38  76  -24  194  985  2,042  -0  1  -13  New Mexico†   -1  6  42  57  -29  64  1,199  1,138  -0  4  19  18  Utah  11  7  19  304  260  21  17  24  591  487  1  0  4  15  7  Wyoming  4  1  3  28  18  -2  6  84  51  -0  2  3  4   Pacific  63  59  202  2,076  2,323  491  809  962 28,667 28,824  4  2  20  87  96  Alaska  1  1  6  44  77  17  11  23  412  416  1  0  19  9  6  California  46  43  105  1,503  1,653  384  664  829 23,657 24,027  1  0  9  21  46  Hawaii  -1  3  36  49  -19  29  647  734  -0  1  13  8  Oregon†   6  7  15  276  305  13  28  58  942  1,074  2  1  6  42  36  Washington  10  6  90  217  239  77  74  142  3,009  2,573  -0  4 2 - -0  2  8  1 7  1  0  1  9  9  Washington  -0  3  3  7  3  0  5  2 2  1 4 American -1  3  35  58  -0  2  25  20  3  28  83  884  947  Connecticut  -0  2  9  12  -0  2  2  1  -1  5  35  49  Maine†   -0  1  4  2  -0  1  3  2  1  1  7  4 2  3 3  Massachusetts  -0  2  15  27  -0  2  15  5  -21  43  594  725  New Hampshire  -0  2  5  10  -0  2  5  10  -2  36  122  48  Rhode Island  -0  1  -2  -0  0  ---0  17  -21  Vermont†   -0  1  2  5  -0  0  -2  2  1  14 -0  2  7  15  -0  2  7  15  -2  5  52  118  Mississippi  -0  1  3  5  -0  1  3  5  3  1  4  35  47  Tennessee†   -0  2  15  20  -0  2  10  11  3  2  10  113  178 W.S. Central  -1  23  48  89  -0  6  20  23  -18  360  472  1,687  Arkansas  -0  3  9  11  -0  2  6  3  -2  21  44  233  Louisiana  -0  1  3  28  -0  1  1  5  -0  3  6  43  Oklahoma  -0  4  8  13  -0  0  -2  -0  124  18  1  Texas†   -1  16  28  37  -0  4  13  13  -15  215  404  1,410   Mountain  1  1  5  53  73  1  0  4  25  21  28  62  230  2,016  3,029  Arizona  1  0  3  16  30  1  0  3  16  10  8  10  177  396  758  Colorado  -0  2  18  15  -0  1  2  -5  20  40  621  966  Idaho†   -0  2  3  4  -0  2  2  3  2  2  11  63  160  Montana  -0  1  3  --0  1 -0  1  2  1  -0  1  2  1  1  2  15  56  87  California  1  3  14  148  124  1  3  14  148  124  1  26  1,136  920  1,090  Hawaii  -0  1  6  10  -0  1  6  5  -2  5  62  135  Oregon†   -1  7  57  35  -1  4  38  35  -2  8  89  588  Washington  1  0  25  28  19  -0  11  11  18  4  7  195  238  625 American Samoa -0  17  52  282  2  0  39  157  508  Alaska  -0  0  ---0  0  --California  -0  17  50  281  2  0  30  137  502  Hawaii  -0  0  ---0 
